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Going to Pot
by Carl E. Schneider

I

n several earlier columns, I suggested
that judges are usually poorly placed
to make good biomedical policy, not
least because the law so rarely offers
them direct and cogent guidance. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit proffered a new example
of this old problem.
In 1996, California's voters approved
Proposition 215. Its "Compassionate
Use Act of 1996" provided -that a patient "who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes
of the patient upon the written or oral
recommendation or approval of a physician" committed no crime.
California's demarche leaves intact
federal drug regulation. The Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) 1 states: "Except as
authorized by this subchapter, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." And it is
"unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid
prescription or order, from a practitioner. "
The CSA divides controlled substances into five schedules. Schedule I is
the most restrictive. Drugs in it have "a
high potential for abuse," "no currently
accepted medical use in treatment," and
no safe use. Schedule I drugs may be
used only for federally approved research. By Congressional direction,
marijuana is a Schedule I drug. Drugs
on Schedules II-V, however, may be prescribed by doctors registered by the
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Drug Enforcement Agency. Registration
may be revoked if"registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest."
Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have insisted that California's legalization of marijuana for medical uses
does not alter federal drug laws. In
1998, for example, the United States
sued to enjoin an organization distributing marijuana under the aegis of Proposition 215. The organization argued that
distribution was medically necessary
and that the CSA implicitly authorized
such a defense. A panel of Ninth Circuit
judges thought this a "legally cognizable
defense" that the district court should
consider. 2 But in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,3 the
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously disagreed. A necessity defense "traditionally
covered the situation where physical
forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two
evils," but that was not the Cooperative's situation. And while the Cooperative alleged that marijuana was medically necessary, the CSA itself"reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception."
In 1997, the government defended
the CSA by reiterating its authority to
1) prosecute any physician who prescribes or recommends marijuana
to patients; 2) prosecute any patient
who uses prescribed marijuana; 3)
revoke the DEA registration numbers of any physician who prescribes or recommends marijuana
to patients; 4) exclude any physician who prescribes or recommends
marijuana to patients from the

Medicaid and Medicare programs;
and 5) enforce all federal sanctions
against physicians and patients. 4
A group of California patients and
physicians then sued to enjoin, inter
alia, Janet Reno and Donna Shalala
from implementing this policy. The
plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated
their first amendment rights. The district court eventually enjoined the government from "(i) revoking any physician class member's DEA registration
merely because the doctor makes a recommendation for the use of medical
marijuana based on a sincere medical
judgment and (ii) from initiating any
investigation solely on that ground." On
29 October 2002, in Conant v. Walters, a
Ninth Circuit panel ratified the injunction because the government's policy
struck "at core First Amendment interests of doctors and patients. An integral
component of the practice of medicine
is the communication between a doctor
and a patient."5
By the time the Ninth Circuit decided Conant, a district court in the District of Columbia Circuit had decided a
similar case-Pearson v. McCaffrey. 6
That court saw no first amendment
problem because the government's policy left doctors and patients free to discuss marijuana's medical qualities until
the cows came home:
It is clear that, short of a prescription or recommendation for marijuana, the federal government will
not get involved in communication
between doctors, patients, and researchers regarding the potential
medical benefits of marijuana use. 7
The Ninth Circuit is not bound by
the D.C. Circuit's decisions, nor is a
U.S. Court of Appeals bound by precedents of U.S. District Courts (which are
trial courts). However, Conant's treatment of Pearson is baffling. Conant says
Pearson withheld an injunction "because
the plaintiffs in that case did not factually support their claim that the policy
chilled their speech." But Pearson says
nothing about chills. Rather, it distinguishes "discussion" from "the recom-
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mendation and prescription of the
drug."
Half a century ago, the Supreme
Court flatly denied that the first amendment "extends its immunity to speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
stature. "8 As Pearson notes, many crimes
are '"committed purely by word of
mouth, such as obtaining money by
false pretenses, extortion, broadcasting
treasonable utterances, and many others."'9 Conant does not say the CSA is
invalid. Conant concedes that a prescription for marijuana violates the act. Indeed, it is a crime. 10 In California, a "recommendation" for marijuana is effectively a prescription. Presumably, therefore, it too affronts the CSA. This is just
what Pearson says: "In these situations, a
recommendation is analogous to a prescription, therefore, the federal government will treat it as such." 11
I wish I could confidently describe
Conant's response to this argument. In
apparent retort, Conant says that, if the
physician intended for the patient to use
the recommendation to obtain marijuana, "then a physician would be guilty of
aiding and abetting the violation of federal law." And Conant says that the injunction does not prevent the government from prosecuting physicians for
that aiding and abetting. True enough.
But so what? If a "recommendation" is a
prescription, if it gives patients access to
marijuana, then making a recommendation itself contravenes the CSA and
therefore is not protected by the first
amendment.
Furthermore, the injunction does not
bar criminal prosecutions; it bars revoking DEA registrations. The CSA requires revocation where "the public interest" requires it. Congress adopted that
broad formula precisely to allow the
government to respond not just to
physicians' crimes, but also to their failures to obey meticulously the elaborate
rules governing drug use and to exercise
their authority over drugs responsibly.
The government is thus presumably entitled and obliged to consider a physician's advice and acts concerning a drug
that Congress declared has no legitimate
medical purpose, a declaration the
12

Supreme Court left unmolested in Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative.
More broadly, while doctors and patients have first amendment interests,
those interests are not necessarily congruent. The patient's interest is primarily in receiving useful and reliable information, not whatever information a
physician may proffer. This is why Judge
Reinhardt could write in the assistedsuicide case that, "since doctors are highly-regulated professionals, it should not
be difficult for the state or the profession
itself to establish rules and procedures
that will ensure that the occasional negligent or careless recommendation by a
licensed physician will not result in an
uninformed or erroneous decision by
the patient or his family." 12 And this is
why the Supreme Court could say in a
pivotal abortion case: "To be sure, the
physician's First Amendment rights not
to speak are implicated, bur only as part
of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by
the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated
by the State here."l3
Dubious as Conant's prohibition on
revoking doctors' DEA registration is, its
prohibition on initiating investigations
because a doctor has "recommended"
marijuana is more so. Conant acknowledges that such recommendations may
violate the CSA. When the government
discovers behavior that may be illegal,
surely it may and perhaps must investigate that behavior. What is more, there
are separation-of-powers reasons to
question a court's authority to prevent
the executive branch from initiating investigations, and Conant cites no precedent for such an order.
Nor would a contrary result in Conant leave California's doctors as flies to
the government's wanton boys. Conant
proffers no evidence that the defendants
had abused their authority. Furthermore, they are constrained by battalions
of constitutional, statutory, and administrative regulations, and their decisions
are subject to judicial review.
I have done my best to summarize
Conant accurately, but it is so Delphicdare I say incoherent?-that I may have

misrepresented it. And the reader may
have found my analysis unsatisfying. In
a way, I do mysel£ Why? Largely because what motivated the government's
policy and the plaintiff's suit had nothing to do with the first amendment.
First amendment jurisprudence speaks
to the issues in the case lamely at best.
The real dispute is about the wisdom of
the state and federal marijuana policies.
But courts lack the authority, information, and expertise to resolve that challenging and controversial issue. Judges
who succumb to the temptation to do so
through the first amendment are using a
butter knife to carve marble-they must
bungle the job and mangle the tool.
1. 21 USC§- 801 et seq.
2. US v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 190 F3d 1109 (1999). Judge Reinhardt,
whose opinion in Compassion in Dying(thc: assisted suicide: case) the Supreme Court unanimously rejected, was a panel member.
3. 532
483 (2001).
4. Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 FSupp2d 113,
116 (DDC 2001).
5. Conant v. Walters, 309 F3d 629 (2002),
2002 WL 31415494. The quotation in the:
previous sentence is from this opinion. The
opinion is by Chief Judge: Schroeder, who was
also a member of the panel in Oakland
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Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative.
6. Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 FSupp2d 113
(DDC 2001).
7. Id at 121.
8. Giboney v. Empire Storage dr lee Co., 336
490, 498 (1949).
9. 139 FSupp2d at 121.
10. "Dispense" means "to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user ... by, or
pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner,
including the prescribing and administering of
a controlled substance .... " 21 USC 802(10).
See US v. Moorl!, 423 US 122 (1975).
11. 139 FSupp2d at 121.
12. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79
F3d 790, 827 (1996) (citations omitted).
13. Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 US 833, 884 (1992).
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